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1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that the mobility of inventors is an important source of knowledge
transfer among research ﬁrms (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, Winter,
Gilbert, and Griliches, 1987; Almeida and Kogut, 1999). Firms use inventors’ mobil-
ity to acquire external knowledge for new innovations (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003;
Song, Almeida, and Wu, 2003). Yet, it may not be obvious to ﬁrms which inventors
they should hire from their large potential employee pool, because ﬁrms may face dif-
ﬁculty in ascertaining how well an inventor is matched with them prior to employment.
Some hired inventors may be poor matches for the job they hold and thus turn out to be
not as good as they initially appeared to be. Because a better job match leads to higher
inventive productivity, one of the fundamental issues in the industrial organization lit-
erature is to identify a mechanism that facilitates a good match between inventors and
ﬁrms. The following questions should be addressed. Which source of information do
inventors and ﬁrms employ to improve the match quality? How does such a mechanism
inﬂuence inventors’ mobility and productivity?
Recent developments in the literature on social and economic networks may offer
a clue to the above research questions. One of the most widely documented facts about
job searches is that networks of personal connections, often called old-boy networks
or informal job networks, can be used by employers to assess their job applicants’
motivation, ability, and likelihood of success.1
Theoretical studies of informal networks in labor markets2 investigated the implica-
tions of the prevalence of informal job networks in the labor market by focusing on such
functions of networks as (1) transmission of job opening information (Calvo-Armengol
and Jackson, 2004; Tassier and Menczer, 2008), (2) screening and signaling employ-
ees’ abilities (Saloner, 1985; Montgomery, 1991; Casella and Hanaki, 2006, 2008),
that is, referrals through job networks may provide ﬁrms with information about un-
observed workers’ ability, allowing ﬁrms to use the information to select high-ability
workers, and (3) reducing uncertainty about employee–employer match quality (Si-
mon and Warner, 1992; Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994), that is, referral through
job networks may provide workers with information about unobserved match quality,
allowing workers to self-select themselves to ﬁrms that represent a good match. This
paper follows this literature and analyzes the effect of inventors’ job networks on their
mobility and productivity.
We use the job search model of Simon and Warner (1992) where an inventor and
a ﬁrm match through a collaboration network. We posit an inventor as networked if,
at the time of his employment, his collaborator (or collaborators) with whom he had
worked in past research activities was (were) present at the ﬁrm. Both inventors and
ﬁrms are uncertain about their match value prior to hiring. However, the match value
is less uncertain for networked inventors than for non-networked inventors. A ﬁrm can
infer the true match value of a potential employee if information about the person is
available from past collaborators, and at the same time, an inventor who is networked
with past collaborators can estimate more precisely how well (or how badly) matched
1For example, Granovetter (1995), in his survey of residents in Newton, Massachusetts, in the late 1960s,
found that more than half of jobs were obtained through personal connections.
2See Ioannides and Loury (2004) for an extensive review of the literature.
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he is for the position offered by a potential employer. The main predictions of the
model are: (1) networked inventors have higher productivity, at least initially, than
non-networked inventors because a good match is more likely to occur; and (2) they
have longer tenure because they are less likely to be disappointed with their revealed
match value and thus are less likely to quit.
This paper investigates whether these predictions of the model hold for patent-
granted inventors who have changed their employers at least once by making use of
the United States patent application database provided by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER). We recompile the patent data by each inventor. Because the
name of the patent assignee, which is typically the inventor’s employer, is listed in
each patent application, we can track down the companies by which each inventor had
been employed over time and thus can identify the inventors’ employment histories. In
the process of tracing inventors’ mobility, identiﬁcation error, often called the “Who
is Who” problem (Trajtenberg, Shiff, and Melamed, 2006), because of the possibility
of multiple name spellings for the same person and the possibility of the same name
for different persons, cannot be avoided. To minimize the error, we deliberately use a
computer matching procedure that has been recently proposed by Trajtenberg, Shiff,
and Melamed (2006).3
The main empirical ﬁndings of this paper are as follows. Comparing employment
durations, networked inventors have signiﬁcantly longer tenure than non-networked in-
ventors. As for inventors’ productivity, which is measured by the number of successful
patent applications made in a year, networked inventors are substantially more produc-
tive than non-networked inventors. It is also found that after-job-switch productivity
is substantially higher for the inventors who are networked with high-productivity col-
laborators than for those who are networked with low-productivity collaborators, sug-
gesting that the collaboration network acts as a screening mechanism to select inven-
tors’ research ability. Nonetheless, even after controlling for positive association be-
tween the inventors’ productivities and their collaborators’ productivities, a substantial
productivity advantage of networked inventors over non-networked inventors remains.
Furthermore, the productivity advantage of networked over non-networked inventors
declines as tenure progresses. These results are shown to be robust even after con-
trolling for both individual and ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved factors. All these empirical
ﬁndings can be consistently explained by the job match hypothesis that the job network
reduces ex ante uncertainty about match value, although they may well be explained
by an alternative hypothesis, such as the “ex post learning” hypothesis, that networked
inventors learn innovation “know-how” through their past collaborators ex post, after
hiring.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it is related to the empir-
ical labor literature which estimates the effects of informal job referral on workers’
tenure and wage proﬁles. Many studies ﬁnd that workers who use references have
longer employment tenure than those who do not use references (Loury, 1983; Topel
and Ward, 1992; Simon and Warner, 1992; Loury, 2006). In contrast, the results are
mixed for the effect of job references on workers’ wage proﬁles. Some studies present
3Recently, several papers (e.g., Agrawal, Covkburn, and McHale, 2006; Schankerman, Shalem, and Tra-
jtenberg, 2006; Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 2007; Hoisl, 2007) have employed a similar identiﬁcation
method.
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evidence that workers with a referral have higher wage premiums, at least initially,
than workers without a referral (Simon and Warner, 1992; Marmaros and Sacerdote,
2002). In contrast, other studies concluded that higher wages are not necessarily asso-
ciated with job references. Bridges and Villemez (1986); Marsden and Hurlbert (1988)
found no general or initial wage premium for referred workers. Kugler (2003) found
that higher wage premiums for referred workers only exist between, not within, indus-
trial sectors. Pellizzari (2004) found that, using the data of European Union countries,
both wage premiums and penalties exist for referred workers across countries and in-
dustries. Antoninis (2006) studied the labor market of the Egyptian manufacturing
sector and found that referred workers take wage penalties in the case of recruitment
to low-skilled jobs, but, if workers are referred by individuals who have direct working
experience with them, they can obtain wage premiums in both low- and high-skilled
jobs. Finally, Loury (2006) showed that only young males who are referred by older-
generation male relatives enjoy higher wages, but no signiﬁcant job reference effect
exists for other groups of workers.
Our paper departs from these empirical studies in that we study inventors who
actively engage in research activities, and we estimate how the existence of personal
connections inﬂuences their research productivity and employment duration after mov-
ing into a new ﬁrm. Given that our focus is on inventors, we directly estimate the effect
of network references on productivities rather than wages. We also reﬁne the deﬁni-
tion of a job reference network. In previous studies, job references through friends,
family, acquaintances and relatives are mainly considered to convey job match infor-
mation. In contrast, we use inventors’ research collaboration networks as a channel for
job information ﬂows.
The second strand of the literature to which this paper relates is the empirical indus-
trial organization literature that studies the extent of the mobility of inventors and its
implications for innovation. Kim and Marschke (2005) analyzed the role of patenting
for ﬁrms to protect their inventive knowledge against spillovers through labor mobil-
ity. They found that ﬁrms’ patenting and inventors’ mobility are positively correlated.
Hoisl (2007) studied the mobility of inventors by using German patent application data
and found that there are simultaneous relationships between inventors’ mobility and
productivity. It is shown that inventors with higher productivity are less likely to move,
and at the same time, movers are more productive than nonmovers. Schankerman,
Shalem, and Trajtenberg (2006) studied inventors’ mobility in the United States soft-
ware industry and found no evidence that the quality of patents increased after their job
changes. This suggests that inventor mobility does not necessarily improve the match
quality between inventors and ﬁrms. While these studies focused on the relationship
between inventor mobility and productivity, this paper, in contrast, studies the effects
of the job search method on the mobility and productivity of inventors.
It should ﬁnally be stressed that our study draws upon the standard job search model
in which a worker who is searching for a job is randomly matched with ﬁrms, and is
offered the expected value of the match as a wage. This view is motivated by Jovanovic
(1984) and Simon and Warner (1992) who consider the role of uncertainty in determin-
ing wages, job tenure and job turnover. Accordingly, we follow the same modeling
approach in that the focus is on the forward looking behavior of workers, with “perfect
competition” assumed for the ﬁrms. In the literature on job search theory, however, var-
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ious models that explicitly account for the search and matching mechanisms of workers
and ﬁrms, including match formation and match dissolution, with various endogenous
wage determination processes in equilibrium, have been developed and analyzed.4 Ba-
sically, two types of the search models leading to endogenous wage distribution can
be distinguished in the literature. The ﬁrst type of the models, a so called, “search-
matching-bargaining-equilibrium” model (see Pissarides, 1979, 2000), assumes that
only a fraction of the surplus goes to workers in the form of a wage, depending upon
the bargaining positions of two parties involved in a match. On the other hand, the
second type of the models, a so called “posting-wage equilibrium” model (see Bur-
dett and Mortensen, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002), assumes that ﬁrms capture
the entire surplus of matches, but workers are paid wages that exceed their reservation
wages because ﬁrms compete by posting wages. Such equilibrium search models have
the advantage that the matching process between workers and ﬁrms are explicitly in-
corporated and thus considered more realistic than the “one-sided” search model on
which we base our inference. However, the disadvantages are that they also require
strong assumptions about the wage determination process, such as agents’ bargaining
power or their commitment to the posted terms of trade. Furthermore, as has been
pointed out (see Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007), high quality data, not only on the
worker’s side data but also on the ﬁrms’ side, is required for the identiﬁcation of equi-
librium search models. To the best of our knowledge, neither theoretical nor empirical
studies have analyzed the equilibrium search behaviors of both workers and ﬁrms that
use job networks for their job search or job hiring. So, one can consider our attempt,
though primitive in modeling the processes of job matching and wage determination,
as a starting point to empirically analyze the role of informal job networks by using
a search theoretic model of the labor market. Admittedly, the extension of our model
to an equilibrium search framework should be pursued through further research, hence
possible extensions will be discussed in conclusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
provides the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the dataset we use for esti-
mation. Section 4 explains our empirical strategies and presents the estimation results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We use the model of Simon and Warner (1992), who employed a discrete-time version
of the job matching model introduced by Jovanovic (1984) to analyze the difference
in wage proﬁles between networked and non-networked workers. While their focus is
on the wages of researchers, we analyze the comparative statics of the productivity of
researchers who are actively engaged in the innovation process, and the predictions are
tested using patent data of the United States.
Consider a situation where inventors, who maximize the discounted sum of future
wages, are searching for a job, and ﬁrms are looking for a new inventor to hire. It is
assumed that an inventor and a ﬁrm are matched randomly. When matched, both the
4See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for recent survey of the
equilibrium search models of the labor market.
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inventor, call him i, and the ﬁrm, call it j, are uncertain about their true match value,
µij , but they receive a noisy signal, µij + "ij , of it. We assume that the noisy signal
µij + "ij and the match productivity µij , if it reveals, are commonly observed by both
of the agents involved in the match, so there is no asymmetric information problem
here. The true match value is individual-ﬁrm speciﬁc and assumed to be independently
drawn from N(¹; ¾2µ). The amount of noise in the signal that the inventor and ﬁrm
receive depends on whether the inventor’s previous collaborators, with whom he had
worked on past research activities, were employed at the ﬁrm at the time of the match.
We call an inventor networked (k = N ) if his previous collaborators are present at
the ﬁrm, and non-networked (k = O) otherwise. The match value is less uncertain
for networked inventors than for non-networked inventors, and thus there is less noise
in the signal for networked inventors. In particular, we assume that white noise "ij
is independently and identically distributed following N(0; ¾2";k) with ¾
2
";N < ¾
2
";O.
The reduction in the noise is due to the possibility of a better information transmission
between the inventor and the ﬁrm the previous collaborators at the ﬁrm facilitate. We
assume that an inventor is networked to a ﬁrm with an exogenously given probability,
p.
We assume that the market is competitive so the ﬁrms make zero expected proﬁt.5
The ﬁrm offers the expected productivity of the inventor, qij ; based on the observed
signal and its quality as the entry wage. If the inventor accepts the offer, he is hired and
works at the ﬁrm. If he rejects the offer, he enters the next period searching for a job
and is matched to another ﬁrm. Once the inventor works at the ﬁrm, we assume that the
true match value, µij , is revealed and is known by both inventor and ﬁrm immediately.
The ﬁrm offers the true match value to the inventor as the future wage, and the inventor
decides whether to stay at the ﬁrm or to leave and look for a new job. Therefore, if
inventor i stays at the ﬁrm, the wage proﬁle offered by the ﬁrm j is
wijt =
(
qij = E(µij jµij + "ij) if t = 1
µij if t ¸ 2:
(1)
It should be noted that, because the match value is ﬁrm speciﬁc, an inventor will ﬁnd
a different match value if he changes ﬁrms. In what follows, the subscripts i and j
are suppressed for notational simplicity. Instead, we introduce subscript k to denote
whether inventor is networked (k = N ) or not (k = O) at the ﬁrm.
The normality assumptions of µ and "k imply, according to the Bayes’ rule, that
the posterior distribution of the estimate on the productivity µ follows N(qk; s2k) with
s2k = (1=¾
2
µ + 1=¾
2
";k)
¡1 and qk = s2k[¹=¾
2
µ + (µ + "k)=¾
2
"k
]. In what follows, we
used F to dnote the CDF of the posterior distribution N(qk; s2k).
The inventor’s decision can be solved backwardly. Assume that he was employed
at the end of period t = 1. Let J(µ) be the present value of staying in the job. The
5The assumption of “perfect competition” can be interpreted as a situation in which workers obtain the
entire surplus generated by the match. This is considered as an extreme case of the equilibrium search models
where, due to the presence of search and matching frictions, employers are assumed to pay their employees
wages lower than their marginal productivities. A possible extension of our model along the line of these
equilibrium approaches will be discussed in the conclusion.
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present value of accepting the offer µ is given by µ + ¯J(µ), where ¯ is the discount
factor. If he rejects it, he receives nothing, and becomes unemployed in the next period.
Let W be the present value of being unemployed at the beginning of a period. Time
invariant match value at a the ﬁrm implies that
J(µ) = max fµ + ¯J(µ); ¯Wg (2)
The decision to stay or to leave the job at the end of period t = 1 is characterized by a
reservation value, µ¤, below which the inventor leaves the job. J(µ) is, therefore:
J(µ) =
(
µ
1¡¯ if µ ¸ µ¤
¯W if µ < µ¤
; (3)
where the reservation value, µ¤ which does not depend on whether the inventor is
networked or not, is given by µ¤ = ¯(1¡ ¯)W .
The probability that an inventor leaves at the employed ﬁrm, which is given byR µ¤
dF (µjqk; s2k), is shown to be an increasing function of ¾2"k. Because ¾2"N < ¾2"O,
not-networked inventors are more likely to leave the employed ﬁrm than networked
inventors. Therefore, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Networked inventors have longer employment duration than non-networked
inventors.
Let us turn to investor’s decision whether to accept initial offer, q. The expected
present value of the future wage ﬂow from accepting initial offer q for type k inventor
is given by q + ¯ E[J(µ)jk]. Therefore, the value of accepting the offer q for type k
inventor is:
V (qjk) = max fq + ¯ E[J(µ)jk]; ¯Wg
= max
½
q + ¯
Z
J(µ)dF (µjqk; s2k); ¯W
¾
: (4)
Since the value function V (qjk) is monotonically increasing in q, the decision whether
to accept the job offer for type k inventor is characterized by the reservation wage q¤k:
q¤k + ¯
Z
J(µ)dF (µjq¤k; s2k) = ¯W: (5)
Given J(µ) shown in equation (3) implies:
q¤k = µ
¤ ¡ ¯
1¡ ¯
Z
µ¤
(µ ¡ µ¤)dF (µjq¤k; s2k): (6)
Because the second term of the right-hand side of equation (6) is positive, the reserva-
tion value in the second period is always larger than the reservation wage in the ﬁrst pe-
riod (µ¤ > q¤k). In addition, while the reservation value µ
¤ does not depend on whether
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the inventor is networked or not, the reservation wage q¤k does. It can be easily shown
that ¾2";N < ¾
2
";O implies q
¤
N > q
¤
O, which means that the ﬁrst period reservation wage
of networked inventors is higher than not-networked inventors. Given q¤N > q
¤
O, the
following result is obtained about the inventor’s mean productivity in the ﬁrst period:
Proposition 2 Networked inventors exhibit a higher initial productivity than non-networked
inventors, on average.
This follows from the fact that the mean productivity for type k inventors, E(µjq > q¤k)
is an increasing function of q¤k.
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We ﬁnally turn to the mean productivity of type k inventors in the second period.
Since the inventors whose match values are less than µ¤ have left the ﬁrm, the mean
productivity of type k inventors in the second period is given by E(µjq > q¤k; µ > µ¤).
One can show that the mean productivity weakly increases with the tenure, i.e.,
E(µjq > q¤k) · E(µjq > q¤k; µ > µ¤): (7)
But the productivity growth is different between two types of inventors, which can be
best illustrated in the limiting case where the information transmission by the inventor’s
past collaborators approaches zero, ¾2"N ! 0, while ¾2"O is strictly positive for the not-
networked inventors. In such a case
E(µjq > q¤N ) = E(µjq > q¤N ; µ > µ¤): (8)
That is, we do not observe any productive growth for networked inventors, while we do
for non-networked inventors as shown above. Therefore, we have the following result:
Proposition 3 Networked inventors have lower productivity growth than non-networked
inventors as tenure increases, so the initial productivity advantage of networked inven-
tors over non-networked inventors disappears as tenure increases.
3 Data
We base our analysis on the NBER Patent Data File.7 This dataset covers all the patent
applications between 1963 and 1999 and those granted up to December 1999. For each
patent, the list of inventors, assignee, and year of application are recorded, along with
other information such as addresses of inventors, the type of assignee, and the techno-
logical category of the patent. We supplement the month of the patent application with
the USPTO PatentBIB database. The NBER Patent Data File contains the patent cita-
tions for patents that were applied for after 1975. Because the citation information is
required to identify unique inventors, as described below, the patents that were applied
for before 1974 are excluded from our sample. It should be noted that many patents that
6For the derivation of this and the following equation (7), see the working paper version of this paper.
7For detailed information, see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).
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were applied for in 1998 and 1999 are missing from the database because there is often
a lag of a few years before patents are granted.8 Therefore, we use the patents that were
applied for between 1975 (the ﬁrst year in which citation information is available) and
1997 (the latest year in which the effect of truncation is not substantial) in our analysis.
3.1 Employment History
In order to analyze the mobility of inventors, we are required to identify, for each
inventor in the dataset, his afﬁliation over time from the information contained in the
patents. This, however, is not a simple task because the same inventor may have his
name spelled differently across his patents, or different inventors may have the same
name. To overcome this difﬁculty, we follow the computerized matching procedure
(CMP) proposed by Trajtenberg, Shiff, and Melamed (2006) in identifying inventors.
In doing so, CMP utilizes not only the name of inventors recorded in the patents, but
also patent citations, and inventors’ addresses, while allowing for the possibility of
spelling errors in names.9 In addition, to increase the accuracy of matching individual
inventors, we focus on the inventors whose addresses are in the United States.
Once inventors are identiﬁed, the history of granted patents is generated for each
inventor. Furthermore, based on the application dates and assignees of those patents,
we create each inventor’s employment history. Our basic strategy is to consider the
longest possible employment durations by assuming that an inventor was employed
by an assignee for all the period during which he applied for patents assigned to the
assignee.
It should be noted, however, that if companies undergo a merger or acquisition,
the acquired company appears under the name of the acquiring company after the of-
ﬁcial date of merger. To avoid identifying changes in the assignee’s name because of
M&A as changes in the inventor’s employer, we supplement our data using the SDC
Platinum, the Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions Database, issued by Thomson–
Reuters. Among all the M&As since 1979 that are reported in SDC Platinum, we select
the cases where the acquiring company obtains all the stock of the target company. We
then consider those two companies to be in a parent–subsidiary relationship and treat
them as one company after the merger. We also subsample the inventors whose lists of
assignees are categorized as private companies located in the United States.10
Let us now describe, in detail, how we construct the employment histories for in-
ventors. We ﬁrst list all the assignees of the patents listed in the individual history.
Then, given the listed assignees, we take the earliest and the latest patent application
dates, and consider the interval between the two dates as a candidate job spell (CJS),
which is considered to be the longest possible employment duration.11 After identify-
8For example, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) showed that the average time lag between the applica-
tion and grant date in the late 1990s was 1.8 years.
9For the details of this procedure, see the Appendix A of the working paper version of this paper.
10To identify the type of assignees listed in the patent application data we utilize the corporate and non-
corporate name matching results available from Bronwyn Hall’s web page of The Patent Name-Matching
Project (http://elsa.berkeley.edu/»bhhall/pat/namematch.html). In this analysis, we
exclude assignees categorized as government institutions, universities and hospitals.
11We allow CJSs whose spell length is zero, which happens when an inventor applies for all the patents
from an assignee within a month.
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ing all the CJSs, we (1) eliminate all the CJSs that are contained entirely within a
longer CJS, and then (2) eliminate the CJSs that overlap with each other. We use cri-
terion (1) because we assume that those patents that have created such shorterCJSs are
the result of inter-assignee collaborations. In addition, we follow criterion (2) because
we are unable to determine the exact time when the inventor moved from one assignee
to another. These criteria are quite stringent, yet we have chosen to follow them be-
cause the determined employment durations are deﬁned as clearly as possible.12 We
deﬁne job spells using all the remaining CJS after the criteria are applied.
The procedure is summarized in Figure 1, which illustrates an inventor’s CJSs
(given by line segments) and the time of patent applications (given by solid circles).
We have CJSj for assignee j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; 5, and patent application, Pjk, the kth patent
application of assignee j. In the diagram, ﬁveCJSs are shown by segments in different
layers for different assignees on the vertical axis. According to the criteria described
above, only CJS1 and CJS2 are considered as job spells (given by arrow segments).
CJS3 is not a job spell because it is contained in CJS2 (criterion (1)). Furthermore,
CJS4 and CJS5 are not job spells because they overlap with each other (criterion (2)).
3.2 Job Network
We obtain information concerning job networks from the patent collaboration histories
of colisted inventors. In doing so, we deﬁne the set of collaborators of inventor i on
date t by all the inventors who are colisted on the patents that inventor i applied for
(and were later granted) before date t. For example, for the inventor shown in Figure 1,
the set of collaborators on date P21 constitutes all of the coinventors listed in the three
patents applied for during spell 1 (those applied for on P11, P12, and P13). Given the
set of his collaborators, we identify collaborator i as networked if at least one of his
collaborators is employed by the same ﬁrm at the beginning of inventor i’s job spell. If
this is not the case, inventor i is considered to be non-networked. The past collaborator
who is networked with the inventor is called the referee because he is assumed to
provide a job reference on the inventor to the potential employer. The referee, in other
words, is considered as a go-between researcher through whom both the inventor and
the ﬁrm are “linked”, and we obtain match quality information.
One feature of the job network construction concerns the presumption of informa-
tion ﬂows between inventors and ﬁrms through referees. Given the growing importance
of teams in research in science nowadays, it seems natural to assume that past research
collaboration provides rich information for both inventors and ﬁrms to judge the job
match of an inventor. Yet, unfortunately, such information cannot be directly observed
in our data, so that we only speculate as to how the information ﬂows between inven-
tors and ﬁrms. We are thus obliged to point out that the interpretation of the empirical
results hinges upon the validity of the assumption of the information ﬂow. Although
the principal message of this paper is that differences in inventors’ mobility and inno-
vation productivity can be explained by the job match mechanism, it is possible to offer
alternative explanations. We provide further discussion of this issue in a later section.
Finally, it is possible that more recently established collaborations generate more
12A similar assumption is made in previous studies (e.g., Hoisl, 2007).
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meaningful job information. Therefore, in the analyses below, we also consider more
restricted sets of collaborators; namely, in addition to the set of collaborators deﬁned
above (we call these overall collaborations), we also consider sets of collaborators at
time t based on the successful patents that have been applied for within 12, 24, and 36
months prior to date t.
3.3 Summary Statistics
The numbers of identiﬁed CJSs and job spells are presented in Table 1. Given the data
construction procedure presented above, we have 271; 348 inventors in total. Because
only inventors who experienced a job switch at least once are analyzed, all inventors
who stayed with only one company are excluded from the sample. Then we have
51; 896 inventors who experienced at least one job switch, which is about 20 % of the
original sample. For those inventors we have 120; 826 CJSs.13 After eliminating the
overlapped CJSs according to criteria (1) and (2), we have 115; 307 job spells, which
represent 95 % of the original CJSs. As for the distribution of the job spells, about 9
% of the job spells are originated by networked inventors. If the collaboration network
is restricted to 12, 24, or 36 months, the percentages are 2:20 %, 4:41 %, and 5:89 %,
respectively.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we examine the model predictions about employment duration and
patent productivities. Table 2 presents the summary statistics. The employment du-
ration of an inventor in one company is measured by the job spells (in months) con-
structed by the procedure above, and patent productivity is measured by the number
of successful patent applications made in one year.14 Comparing networked and non-
networked inventors, the former have longer mean and median employment durations
than the latter. In particular, the median statistics imply that it takes about eight years
(six years) for half of the networked (non-networked) inventors, respectively, to leave
ﬁrms. As for inventors’ patent proliﬁcacy, it is shown that networked inventors are
more productive than non-networked inventors. After the job change, on average, net-
worked inventors produce more than one patent a year while non-networked inventors
produce less than one patent a year.
4.1 Employment Duration Results
Proposition 1 suggests that networked inventors, with relatively better match values,
are less likely to leave ﬁrms than non-networked inventors. Figure 2 plots the survival
13It should be noted that, in order to construct the CJSs, we exclude the ﬁrst CJSs and use only subse-
quent CJSs of inventors because no inventors are networked for their ﬁrst CJSs.
14We also considered a productivity measure that controls for the innovation quality of each patent. Given
the idea that more important patents are cited more frequently, we deﬁned a quality-adjusted productivity
measure by the number of patent applications weighted by the number of times that each patent is cited by
other patents. A potential problem of this productivity measure, however, is in the fact that the number of
citations is severely truncated, and thus patent quality is underestimated in more recent years.
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curves for employment duration after job transition for networked and non-networked
inventors. Because the job spell data are arbitrarily censored,15 we employ a nonpara-
metric maximum likelihood estimator for interval-censored data proposed by Turnbull
(1976). It is shown that the employment duration is almost uniformly longer for net-
worked inventors than for non-networked inventors. We also use the log-rank statistic
of (Peto and Peto, 1972) to test the equality of the survival functions between the net-
worked and non-networked inventors for various deﬁnitions of the collaboration net-
work, and ﬁnd that all the tests are strongly rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level. 16
We estimate hazard regression models of inventors’ job turnover, controlling for
their characteristics. The hazard function is given by a Weibull speciﬁcation as fol-
lows: h(tif jXif ) = exp(Xif¯+±NETif )®t®¡1if where tif is inventor i’s employment
duration at ﬁrm f , and Xif is a vector of time-invariant individual characteristic vari-
ables. The deﬁnitions of the variables are presented in Appendix. Among the control
variables, the most important one is the network dummy, NETif , which takes a value
of one if inventor i is a networked inventor at ﬁrm f and zero otherwise. According
to Proposition 1, we expect that ± < 0, that is, networked inventors are less likely to
leave their employed job than non-networked inventors. As other regression variables,
we include research ﬁeld dummies, past productivities, and research experience, all of
which are used to control for the inventor’s research ability.
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the hazard regression model. As in the
survival curve analysis, interval censoring is taken into account for estimation. We use
the total number of patents previously applied for in column (1), and use the average
number of patents previously applied for in column (2) to control for the inventor’s
ability, respectively. In both speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcient ± is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant, and thus the presence of previous collaborators at the new ﬁrm signiﬁcantly
decreases the hazard of leaving the job. Therefore, the networked inventors are likely
to stay longer at the ﬁrm than the non-networked inventors. In columns (3)–(5), we
use various deﬁnitions of networked inventors that limit the intervals after the collab-
orations were made. The estimates of the coefﬁcients of network dummies are signif-
icantly negative in all speciﬁcations. These estimates imply that networked inventors
are about 40% less likely to leave the job than non-networked inventors.
4.2 Productivity Results
Our model presents two main empirically testable hypotheses about inventors’ produc-
tivity. The ﬁrst hypothesis is given by Proposition 2, that networked inventors have
a higher initial productivity than non-networked inventors on average. The second
hypothesis is given by Proposition 3, that within-ﬁrm productivity growth rates are
different between non-networked inventors and networked inventors; in particular, the
former have a steeper productivity–tenure proﬁle than the latter. Thus, the initial pro-
ductivity advantage of networked inventors over non-networked inventors disappears
as tenure progresses.
15Our job spell data are arbitrarily censored because the value lies in an interval, instead of being observed
exactly.
16For detailed test results, see the working paper version of this paper.
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To examine these hypotheses, we introduce a regression framework. The dependent
variable of the regression is the number of successful patent applications made by an
inventor in one year, which is considered to be a measure of the inventor’s productivity.
Because the dependent variable is an integer variable with many zeros and ones, we
use a Poisson-based speciﬁcation as in Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984); Hall and
Ziedonis (2001). Consider an inventor i who works at ﬁrm f . We assume that the
expected number of patents, Pift, applied for by the inventor in year t, conditional on
the characteristics of the inventor and ﬁrm, is given by:
E(PiftjXift; NETif ) = exp(®+Xift¯ + ½NETif ); (9)
where Xift is a vector of individual-ﬁrm time-speciﬁc variables.
A key variable in our speciﬁcation above is the network dummy, NETif . The
scalar coefﬁcient ½ of the network dummy can be interpreted as the match premium
for networked inventors over non-networked inventors. According to Proposition 2,
the networked inventors can obtain information about their match values with their
potential employers through their collaboration network, and thus have better initial
match values than non-networked inventors. We thus expect that the match premium is
positive in the early stage of tenure.
As mentioned in the introduction, however, the role of collaboration networks may
not be conﬁned to reducing match uncertainty between inventors and ﬁrms. It is argued
in previous studies that network references may act as a screening device in the selec-
tion of high-ability workers. Knowing that referees tend to refer others who are similar
to themselves, ﬁrms have incentives to select inventors who were referred by high-
productivity referees rather than those who were referred by low-productivity referees.
Therefore, if the collaboration network works as the screening device, the productivity
of a networked inventor will be positively correlated with the productivity of the referee
who referred the inventor to the ﬁrm.
To capture the screening effect through the collaboration network, the regression
variables include the productivity of the referee inventor who referred inventor i to
ﬁrm f (we call this the referee’s productivity). We measure the referee’s productivity
by the total number of patents that he applied for at ﬁrm f before inventor i switched
to the ﬁrm. For non-networked inventor i, because he was not referred by anybody
at the job switch, the referee’s productivity variable is set to be zero. If the screening
mechanism works for the collaboration network, it is predicted that the referee’s pro-
ductivity is positively related to networked inventor i’s productivity, and thus the sign
of the estimated coefﬁcient of the referee’s productivity is positive. It should be noted
that the screening effect is not captured by the match premium ½ of the coefﬁcient of
NETif . The job match hypothesis implies that the match premium is positive, ½ > 0,
no matter who is the referee. In other words, a networked inventor was able to obtain
information about his match value with the potential employer, even through a referee
who exhibits low patent productivity. Therefore, the job match hypothesis alone cannot
explain positive association in productivity between the referee inventors and referred
inventors.
As other regression variables forXift, we include research experience and within-
ﬁrm research experience, respectively, to control for the effect of experience on patent
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productivity. The past productivities are also included to take into account the in-
ventor’s innate research ability, as was done for the hazard regression. In addition,
the ﬁrm’s patent productivity is used to control for the research capacity of the ﬁrm.
It is expected that the higher the ﬁrm’s research capacity, the more patents the ﬁrm
produces, and vice versa.17 Finally, following the previous literature, (e.g., Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001), we include annual dummies, which account for the growth of patent-
ing propensities, and the ﬁrst-year tenure dummy, which takes a value of one if the
inventor is in the ﬁrst year of employment. The variable is included to control for our
job spell construction property, that at least one patent is included in the ﬁrst tenure
year. Again, detailed deﬁnitions of these control variables are found in Appendix.
In the following estimation we take into account the time-invariant unobserved in-
dividual factors. If such unobserved factors of inventors are not explicitly controlled
for, the estimated productivity difference between networked and non-networked in-
ventors can be explained by differences in their unobserved factors, such as ability. For
that purpose we augment the baseline regression model (9) by adding an individual
time-invariant ﬁxed effect:
E(PiftjXift; NETif ) = exp(®i +Xift¯ + ½NETif ): (10)
The ﬁxed effect, ®i, captures inventor i’s unobserved heterogeneity that affects his
research productivity. One ﬁnal concern about the Poisson regression model (10) is
possible correlation of productivities, Pift and Pjft, between inventors i and j within
ﬁrm f . This type of within-group correlation is typically explained by an unobserved
group-speciﬁc factor, say, ®f , that is common to inventors i and j who work in the
same ﬁrm f . It is known (see Wooldridge, 2006, for example) that the ﬁxed-effect
Poisson regression model is robust to this type of within-group or cluster correlation
under the assumption that the variables, Xift and NETif , are strictly exogenous con-
ditional on the unobserved factors ®i and ®f . 18 Yet, the variance–covariance matrix is
misspeciﬁed in this case. Therefore, we compute a cluster-robust variance–covariance
matrix using the bootstrap method with 50 replications, and report the cluster-robust
standard errors for the parameter estimates.
Table 4 presents the estimates of the selected covariates of the Poisson regression
model (10).19 We again restrict samples to the inventors who experienced at least one
job transition because no inventor is recruited via his collaboration network for the ﬁrst
job. It thus implies that we estimate the effect of referrals on inventors’ productivity
after switching ﬁrms.20 As should be clear from the above discussion, the data have an
unbalanced panel structure with individual-ﬁrm-year being the unit of analysis.
In Table 4, column (1) shows the estimation results using the network dummy con-
structed from the overall collaboration network. It is found that the estimate of the
17Often the research capacity of a ﬁrm is measured by its R&D expenditure. We do not use it here because
in our sample there are ﬁrms that are not listed on the stock market and such data are not available.
18We relax the assumption of conditional exogeneity in Section 4.3 where we check the robustness of the
estimation results.
19The estimates of all the covariates are available from the author upon request.
20The effect of network job referrals on the ﬁrst employment productivity of workers, although they are
not necessarily inventors, is analyzed by Simon and Warner (1992); Loury (2006).
14
match premium of the networked inventors, ½, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Columns (2)–(4) present the estimation results that consider collaborations only from
limited intervals before the job switch. It is also consistently found that the estimated
values of ½ are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. All these ﬁndings conﬁrm that
networked inventors are more productive than non-networked inventors. More inter-
estingly, the match premium increases as the coverage period of collaboration networks
becomes shorter. This suggests that better job matches are more likely to occur between
inventors and ﬁrms if referrals are based on more recent collaborations. These ﬁndings
are consistent with our view that the collaboration network is a method by which agents
get information about unobserved match quality, and the more recent the information
is, the more certain they are about the quality of their match. The estimation results
also show that the coefﬁcients of the referee’s productivity are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, suggesting that inventors who were referred by higher-productivity referees
tend to be more productive than those who were referred by lower-productivity refer-
ees. This suggests that ﬁrms may examine the referee’s productivity to select high-
ability inventors among potential employees. Nevertheless, the fact that a substantial
match premium remains after controlling for the network screening effect seems to
support the job match hypothesis. These ﬁndings thus indicate that the collaboration
network simultaneously has two roles: one is to provide ﬁrms with the information
needed to screen an inventor’s ability, and the other is to provide ﬁrms and inventors
with information about their match quality.
As for the other control variables, many of the estimates conﬁrm our prior expec-
tation. As one expects, the coefﬁcients of past patent productivity are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the inventors who had applied for more patents
tended to produce more patents after their job change. Furthermore, the coefﬁcients
of ﬁrm patent productivity are, as expected, positive and statistically signiﬁcant. It is
also shown that there is a strong positive relationship between an inventor’s productiv-
ity and his total research experience, although the relationship is less evident between
productivity and within-ﬁrm research experience.
We now turn to the second hypothesis, that within-ﬁrm productivity growth is dif-
ferent between networked and non-networked inventors. To examine this hypothesis,
we add the interaction terms of the network dummy and tenure dummies to the regres-
sion model (10). The regression model is then given by:
E(PiftjXift; NETif ) = exp(®i +Xift¯ +
KX
k=1
½k(NETif ¢ Tenureiftk); (11)
where Tenureiftk is the kth tenure year dummy for inventor i at ﬁrm f , and takes a
value of one if inventor i is employed in the kth year by ﬁrm f . In this within-ﬁrm
productivity growth regression, the coefﬁcient ½k of the interaction term captures the
productivity premium for networked inventors over non-networked inventors observed
in the kth tenure year. A positive value of ½k means that the networked inventors
have a higher productivity than non-networked inventors in tenure year k. As can be
shown easily,
P
k ½k = ½. Although the theoretical model considered above assumes
that agents learn about the true match value after one period, such learning may take
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place over several years in reality. Therefore, given the hypothesis that within-ﬁrm
productivity growth is faster for non-networked inventors than for the networked in-
ventors, we predict that the coefﬁcient ½k is weakly decreasing with tenure year k, i.e.,
½1 ¸ ½2 ¸ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¸ ½K .
In Figure 3, the estimated ½ks are plotted up to 15 tenure years for the network
dummies constructed from the overall collaborations (a) and from within-12-month
collaborations (b). 21 The estimated ½ks are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the
5% level for the ﬁrst four to ﬁve tenure years. It is apparent that the magnitude tends
to decrease globally as tenure year k increases, although the pattern is not necessar-
ily uniform. Therefore, they seem to be consistent with the job match hypothesis that
non-networked inventors have a steeper tenure–productivity proﬁle than networked in-
ventors, and the initial productivity advantage of the former over the latter diminishes
with tenure years.
Of course, the observed nonuniformity of ½k cannot be explained by our model,
which predicts that ½k decreases uniformly as k changes. In a later section, we discuss
an alternative story that might be compatible with the estimation results.
4.3 Robustness Check
The estimation results presented above indicate that the positive match premium of
networked inventors is consistent with our story that the references through collabora-
tion networks may create better matches between inventors and ﬁrms. However, it is
possible to provide alternative explanations for such a story.
First, consider the cost of patent production per inventor. Because it may decline
with the number of coauthors per patent, inventors who tend to work in groups or
collaborate on projects might appear to be more productive than those who do not.
This is simply because they have many coauthors and thus devote relatively less time
to produce one patent. This problem may occur when networked inventors are more
likely to work on projects than the non-networked inventors. If this happens, networked
inventors appear to be more productive than the non-networked inventors, not because
of their higher match value, but because of their sheer tendency to work in groups.
Second, we should carefully control for unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that may
produce a positive correlation between productivity and collaboration. For example, if
an inventor is working in a large ﬁrm, his patent productivity is enhanced by, say, his
employer’s large research potential. However, at the same time, his previous collabora-
tors are likely to be hired by the same company that he now works for. Hence, if large
companies provide both resources and collaborators, networked inventors may exhibit
higher productivity than non-networked inventors, but it is not caused by the improved
match quality through the collaboration network as we have maintained.
To examine the ﬁrst alternative hypothesis, we take care of the possibility that the
patent productivity is “inﬂated” by coauthorships. Assuming that the coauthors con-
tribute equally to patent production, individual contribution by each inventor to each
patent is given by the inverse of the number of coauthors of the patent. Therefore,
21The estimates other than the coefﬁcient ½s are shown overall to be quantitatively similar to those of
the productivity regressions that are presented in Table 4. The full estimation results are available from the
author upon request.
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coauthorship-adjusted productivity is given by the annual sum of an inventor’s patent
contributions per coauthor. More precisely, suppose that inventor i applied for a total
of Mit patents in year t. Let Nm be the number of coauthors of the mth patent for
m = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;Mit. Then, the coauthorship-adjusted productivity of inventor i in year t
is given by Pit =
PMit
m=1 1=Nm. Using this “weighted” productivity measure as the
dependent variable, we re-estimate the regressions.
We examine the second alternative hypothesis by explicitly controlling for unob-
served ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that may inﬂuence the employees’ productivity. Consider
the following “two-way” ﬁxed effect model as a linear regression model: 22
E(PiftjXift; NETif ) = ®i + ®f +Xift¯ + ½NETif ;
where ®i is the individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect and ®f is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect.
We now assume that the ﬁxed effects, ®i and ®f , are correlated with the covariates,
Xift and NETif . Given this speciﬁcation, ﬁrst-differencing can eliminate the time-
invariant individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect ®i. Suppose that inventor i worked at ﬁrm f
at time t and worked at ﬁrm g at time t+1. Then, the resulting time-differenced linear
regression with the error term uifg is given as follows:
¢Pifg = ®fg +¢Xifg¯ + ½¢NETifg + uifg;
where ¢Pifg = Pi(t+1)g ¡ Pitf , ¢Xifg = Xi(t+1)g ¡ Xitf , and ¢NETifg =
Netif ¡ Netig . The parameter ®fg is given by the difference between the two ﬁrm-
speciﬁc ﬁxed effects (®g ¡ ®f ). Then we apply the usual “group mean-differencing”
to eliminate the group-invariant ﬁrm ﬁxed effect, ®fg , and obtain the “within-group”
estimator from the following regression:
¢Pifg ¡¢Pfg = (¢Xifg ¡¢Xfg)¯ + ½(¢NETifg ¡¢Netfg) + (uifg ¡ ufg); (12)
where ¢Pfg is the group average of the difference in productivity, ¢Pifg , over all
inventors who switch from company f to g. The other group-average variables are
constructed accordingly.
Table 5 presents estimates of the network effect, ½, from the productivity regres-
sion with “coauthor-weighted” productivity being the dependent variable. Panel A
presents the estimation results controlling for only the individual ﬁxed effect, and
panel B presents the estimation results controlling for both individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects. The estimates of panel B are based on the two-way ﬁxed-effect regression
model (12).23. We also estimate the ﬁxed-effect regression model using productiv-
ity “unweighted” by coauthorship. We ﬁnd that the estimation results are overall the
22At ﬁrst look, one may think a “two-way” ﬁxed effect model works such as E(PiftjXift; NETif )
= exp(®i + ®f +Xift¯ + ½NETif ) works. However, the conditional maximum likelihood estimation
method proposed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) cannot be applied to this “two-way” ﬁxed-effect
model. This is simply because there exists no appropriate statistic on which the likelihood function should
be conditioned. Thus, we need to use a different strategy to control for both individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects
at the same time in the population regression model.
23The full estimation results are available form the author upon request.
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same.24 Because the dependent variables of both the regressions are no longer inte-
ger valued, we can use the linear regression models instead of the Poisson regression
models. The results in columns (1)–(4) show that, for all speciﬁcations of network
recruitment dummies, the match premiums are again positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant. Thus, we ﬁnd solid evidence that, on average, networked inventors produce more
patents than non-networked inventors after their job change.
Figure 4 plots the estimated ½ks from the regression models with interaction terms
of the network dummy and tenure dummies. The estimates are obtained from the linear
regression model, analogous to the regression model of the interaction terms (11), with
one-way individual ﬁxed effect (solid line) and with two-way individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects (dashed). For both regressions, the dependent variables are coauthor-weighted
productivity, and the network dummies are constructed from within-12-month collab-
orations. 25
As presented, the pattern of estimated ½ks is very similar to that from the previ-
ous Poisson regression models. Overall, the estimated ½ks decline as tenure year k
increases, although the ½ks are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at least for the ﬁrst
several tenure years. Hence, we may be able to conclude that the productivity ad-
vantage of networked inventors over non-networked inventors declines as tenure years
increase and eventually becomes negligible. It is thus shown that this may not be just
an artifact caused by inventors’ group-work tendency, nor by ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved
factors.
5 Conclusion
This paper used a simple model of job search and learning about match productivity,
and tested the model’s predictions using panel data of afﬁliations and productivities of
inventors constructed from the NBER parent database. The empirical analysis seems
to support the prediction of the theoretical model. It is found that networked inventors
who moved to companies where their research collaborators were employed had sig-
niﬁcantly longer tenure than non-networked inventors who moved to companies with
which they had no personal connections. Moreover, the former group produced sub-
stantially more patents than the latter group several years after their job switches, but
the productivity gap between the two groups had declined as tenure years increased.
These ﬁndings seem to be consistently explained by the job match story that inven-
tors and ﬁrms can discover match quality through job networks, ex ante, that is, before
hiring. Interestingly, there is also evidence that job networks operate as a screening
mechanism, and that they enable ﬁrms to extract information about the potential em-
ployees’ unobserved ability through their referees’ observed abilities. Finally, ﬁxed-
effect regression results showed that unobserved individual and ﬁrm characteristics
cannot explain all of the productivity differences between networked inventors and
non-networked inventors.
While the presented empirical evidence leads us to conclude that collaboration net-
works reduce the uncertainty in match quality, there are several qualiﬁcations to keep
24The estimation results are available from the author upon request.
25We also plotted the estimated ½k using different collaboration intervals, and found similar patterns.
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in mind. First, as we remarked previously, we cannot observe the actual job hiring pro-
cess. Being employed by the ﬁrm that had already employed a past collaborator does
not necessarily imply that the collaborator provided a job reference on the person to the
ﬁrm. Therefore, our assumption that an inventor and a ﬁrm exchange job match infor-
mation through the past collaborator (or collaborators) should be challenged carefully.
Yet, unfortunately, we cannot provide any empirical support for that assumption using
the data at our disposal. Second, alternative mechanisms might well explain differences
in job tenure length and patent productivity between networked and non-networked in-
ventors. For example, if networked inventors, after their job change, learn job skills in
an employment relationship with previous collaborators more easily and readily than
non-networked inventors, the former become more skillful, and thus less vulnerable
to job termination and more productive in patent applications than the latter. Such “ex
post learning” theory might explain the nonuniformity in the productivity gap observed
in the regression results. It would be consistent with the idea that non-networked in-
ventors take some time to learn how to interact with other researchers, so that, after
years of development, they eventually “catch up” to networked inventors.26 We are
thus obliged to acknowledge that the “ex ante learning” story that we have proposed so
far is not the only theory that is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings.
Despite all of these qualiﬁcations, we hope that our analysis sheds light on, as a
minimum, one important aspect of the job search and matching process that inventors
and ﬁrms face. Of course, examining the alternative theories about learning, which are
the “ex ante learning” theory and the “ex post learning” theory, is no doubt an important
research goal, but it requires more detailed information about the job hiring process,
which, unfortunately, is not available from our patent-based data set. Therefore, we
leave a complete analysis of this issue for future research.
The results of this paper have several implications for future research. First, it is
possible to extend our model to incorporate the two learning processes, “ex ante learn-
ing” and “ex post learning”, to explain the job search and matching between inventors
and ﬁrms. One such attempt was made by Nagypal (2007), although she does not ex-
plicitly take into account learning through networks. With the wider availability of job
hiring data, an empirical model could be estimated.
Second, although it is suggested that network-based recruitment enables ﬁrms to
hire better-matched inventors than other recruitment methods, it is found that many
inventors were not necessarily recruited through network references. This may raise
the possibility that ﬁrms self-select themselves into segregated labor markets in which
some ﬁrms use network-based recruitment methods and other ﬁrms use non-network-
based methods such as public recruitment. This paper assumes that a ﬁrm’s choice of
recruitment method is exogenously given by some process unrelated to job search and
matching, and thus does not explicitly account for a ﬁrm’s endogenous use of networks
in hiring inventors. Therefore, future work is needed to address this issue.
Third, as mentioned in the introduction, our model is based on “one-sided” search
behaviors of inventors with the assumption of ﬁrms’ behaviors being perfectly com-
petitive. The results must be viewed within this partial equilibrium context. Hence, in
future research our search model should be extended to a general equilibrium frame-
26We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.
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work that explicitly describes how inventors and ﬁrms get together and how the match
surplus is distributed among agents. In such an equilibriummodel, wages should be de-
termined by the ﬂow of contacts between inventors and ﬁrms and the degree of search
and matching frictions in the labor market. Various approaches have been proposed
in previous studies to model the endogenous wage determination process. A “posting-
wage equilibrium” approach, taken by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) seems promis-
ing, in which the inventor’s bargaining power is essentially zero, but the wage is set to
the maximum possible productivity of the inventor due to competitive pressures among
ﬁrms. It can be shown that, under certain assumptions, the equilibrium accepted wage
distribution is fully determined by the search friction and the productivities of inven-
tors and ﬁrms. Their multi-step estimation method that separates the parameters that
can be estimated from a cross-sectional wages from the parameters requiring transition
data for identiﬁcation may allow us to identify and estimate the structural parameters
of the equilibrium search model, if a rich matched employer-employee panel data on
inventors’ productivities, job ﬂows and wages becomes available.
Finally, our ﬁndings indicated that ﬁrms may use interﬁrm R&D networks not only
as a way of exploiting external knowledge, as previously reported by the industrial
organization literature (e.g., Singh, 2005), but also as a way of recruiting inventors with
good match values and high research abilities through inventors’ referrals. This unique
role of R&D networks, which was downplayed by previous studies, may explain the
observed relationship between ﬁrms’ inventive productivity and their network position
in R&D networks (Ahuja, 2000; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). The empirical ﬁnding of
this paper suggested that ﬁrms with higher connectivity in R&D networks can recruit
better-matched inventors than those with low connectivity because the former ﬁrms
can use more interﬁrm referrals than the latter ﬁrms in their hiring processes. Thus, a
future extension of this paper will examine this hypothesis, and it will be a step forward
in understanding the mechanism of how the global R&D network structure inﬂuences
ﬁrm-level innovation.
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Assignee 1
Assignee 2
Assignee 3
Date
P11 P13P12 ApplicationP21 P22
Assignee 4
Assignee 5
CJS1 (Valid)
CJS2 (Valid)
P41 P42P51 P52P31 P32
CJS3 (Not Valid)
CJS4 (Not Valid)
CJS5 (Not Valid)
Figure 1: An example of employment history construction. The inventor has applied
for patents from ﬁve different assignees, thus has ﬁve candidate job spells (CJSs).
CJS3 is not a valid job spelll because it is contained in CJS2. CJS4 and CJS5
are not job spells because they overlap with each other.
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Figure 2: Survival Curves for Employment Duration after Job Transition
21
!
"
#$
!
"
#%
"
#%
& % ' ( ) $ * + , &" && &% &' &( &)
!
!
!
!
!
!
"
#$
!
"
#%
"
#%
& % ' ( ) $ * + , &" && &% &' &( &)
!
!
!
!
!"#$"%&'$()'()*+),-.-, /$0"#$"%&'$()'()*+),-.-,
1*+)23$%4-$&-)/$(-5.',0
60("7'(-
60("7'(-
8'9):.-5',,)23,,';35'("3$0
8;9)<"(="$>?@>A3$(=)23,,';35'("3$0
B-'50
B-'50
Figure 3: Estimation result of the productivity premium ½k of networked inventor over
non-networked inventor in tenure year k. The estimates are based on the productivity
growth regression model (11). Network dummies are constructed from the overall
collaborations (a) and within-12 month collaborations (b).
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Figure 4: Estimation result of the productivity premium ½k of networked inventor over
non-networked inventor in tenure year k.The estimates are based on the productivity
growth regression model (11) of coauthor-adjusted productivity. Within-12-month col-
laborations are considered for the estimation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Inventors and Jobspells
Count Fraction
All Inventors 271,348 1
Job hopped Inventors 51,896 0.19
All Candidate Job Spells 120,862 1
Overlapped Spells 5,555 0.05
Job Spells 115,307 1
Networked Inventors 10,758 0.09
within 36 months 6,704 0.06
within 24 months 5,081 0.04
within 12 months 2,538 0.02
Non-networked Inventors 104,549 0.91
Table 2: Employment Duration and Patent Productivity
Mean S.D. Median
EMPLOYMENT DURATION
All Inventors 95.320 87.286 75
Networked Inventors 109.371 67.855 93
Non-networked Inventors 90.566 90.027
PATENT PRODUCTIVITY
All Inventors 1.121 0.615 1
Networked Inventors 1.126 0.820 1
Non-networked Inventors 0.989 0.588 1
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Table 3: Weibull Hazard Regression Results
OVERALL LIMITED INTERVAL
COLLBORATION COLLABORATIONy
WITHIN 36 WITHIN 24 WITHIN 12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Network referral dummy: ± ¡:5058 ¡:4675 ¡:4325 ¡:4269 ¡:4395
(:031) (:030) (:039) (:044) (:060)
Research ﬁeld dummies:
Chemical ¡1:2045 ¡1:1882 ¡1:2110 ¡1:2136 ¡1:2171
(:031) (:031) (:031) (:031) (:031)
Comp.& Comm. ¡1:0751 ¡1:0771 ¡1:0783 ¡1:0782 ¡1:0783
(:035) (:035) (:035) (:035) (:035)
Drugs & Medical ¡1:0293 ¡1:0223 ¡1:0362 ¡1:0367 ¡1:0387
(:039) (:039) (:038) (:038) (:038)
Elec. & Electronics ¡1:1066 ¡1:1008 ¡1:1000 ¡1:1003 ¡1:0996
(:031) (:031) (:031) (:031) (:031)
Mechanical ¡1:1505 ¡1:1476 ¡1:1476 ¡1:1490 ¡1:1489
(:030) (:030) (:030) (:030) (:030)
Others ¡1:0775 ¡1:0782 ¡1:0763 ¡1:0769 ¡1:0748
(:031) (:030) (:030) (:030) (:030)
Total past productivity :0287 :0273 :0269 :0259
(:002) (:002) (:002) (:002)
Average past productivity :0326
(:004)
Total research experience ¡:0893 ¡:0819 ¡:0965 ¡:0958 ¡:0900
(:009) (:009) (:009) (:009) (:009)
(Total research experience)2 :0036 :0035 :0039 :0039 :0037
(:000) (:000) (:000) (:000) (:000)
log® z :4142 :4125 :4183 :4200 :4231
(:010) (:010) (:010) (:010) (:010)
Constant ¡5:0659 ¡5:0755 ¡5:1001 ¡5:1243 ¡5:1809
(:074) (:074) (:075) (:074) (:074)
Log-likelihood -16489 -16510 -16573 -16592 -16619
Observations 33178 33178 33178 33178 33178
NOTE.– Dependent variable is inventor’s employment duration. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. All variables are statistically signiﬁcant at less than one
percent level (p < :01).
y Collaborations from limited intervals before the job switch are considered. The
Intervals are within 36 months, 24 months, and 12 months before the job switch.
z The duration dependence is represented by parameter ®.
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Table 4: Fixed-effect Poisson Regression Estimates
Overall Within 36 Within 24 Within 12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network referral dummy: ½ 0:1023*** 0:1270*** 0:1551*** 0:1806***
(0:0169) (0:0165) (0:0232) (0:0330)
Referee’s productivity 0:0012* 0:0014*** 0:0014** 0:0017***
(0:0006) (0:0005) (0:0006) (0:0006)
Past total productivity 0:0394*** 0:0395*** 0:0395*** 0:0392***
(0:0029) (0:0025) (0:0025) (0:0026)
Firm’s productivity 0:3045*** 0:3061*** 0:3072** 0:3074***
(0:0867) (0:0689) (0:1406) (0:1141)
Total research experience 0:0263 0:0267 0:0270 0:0273
(0:0185) (0:0217) (0:0216) (0:0200)
(Total research experience)2 0:0011*** 0:0010*** 0:0010*** 0:0010***
(0:0001) (0:0002) (0:0002) (0:0001)
Within-ﬁrm research experience 0:0062 0:0053 0:0052 0:0048
(0:0050) (0:0051) (0:0057) (0:0060)
(Within-ﬁrm research experience)2 0:0007* 0:0007* ¡0:0007 ¡0:0006
(0:0004) (0:0004) (0:0005) (0:0004)
Log-likelihood ¡236433:22 ¡236423:18 ¡236410:06 ¡236425:31
Observations 286; 954 286; 954 286; 954 286; 954
NOTE.– Dependent variable is the number of patents applied by inventor. Collaborations from
limited intervals before the job switch are considered. The Intervals are within 36 months, 24
months, and 12 months before the job switch. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
¤ p < :1. ¤ ¤ p < :05. ¤ ¤ ¤ p < :01.
Table 5: Fixed-effect Poisson Regression Using Coauthorship-Adjusted Productivity
Overall Within 36 Within 24 Within 12
PANEL A: INDIVIDUAL FE
Network referral dummy: ½ 0:0586*** 0:0564*** 0:0732*** 0:0937***
(0:0113) (0:0124) (0:0141) (0:0162)
Referee’s productivity 0:0010** 0:0013*** 0:0013*** 0:0014***
(0:0004) (0:0004) (0:0004) (0:0005)
PANEL B: INDIVIDUAL AND FIRM FES
Network referral dummy: ½ 0:0604*** 0:0519*** 0:0502*** 0:0489**
(0:0127) (0:0123) (0:0152) (0:0200)
Referee’s productivity 0:0008*** 0:0012*** 0:0012*** 0:0014***
(0:0003) (0:0003) (0:0003) (0:0003)
NOTE.– Dependent variable is the coauthorship-adjusted productivity of inventor. Collaborations
from limited intervals before the job switch are considered. The Intervals are within 36 months, 24
months, and 12 months before the job switch. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ¤ p < :1.
¤ ¤ p < :05. ¤ ¤ ¤ p < :01.
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Appendix
Deﬁnitions of the Variables
NETif : a dummy variable that takes one if an inventor i refers his collaboration
network in the job turnover to ﬁrm f and takes zero otherwise.
Tenureiftk (k = 1; : : : ; 22): the kth tenure year dummy for inventor i at ﬁrm f . It
takes one if inventor i is employed in k-th year by ﬁrm f and takes zero other-
wise.
Research ﬁeld dummies : Six dummy variables according to the following six indus-
trial categories:
Chemical : chemical.
Comp.& Comm. : computer and communications.
Drugs & Medical : drugs and medical.
Elec. & Electronics : electrical and electronics.
Mechanical : mechanical.
Others : other research ﬁelds, such as agriculture, amusement devices, apparel
and textile, etc.
See the detailed deﬁnition of each catagory in http://www.nber.org/
patents/subcategories.txt.
Total research experience : Elapsed years for an inventor since his/her ﬁrst patent ap-
plication.
Within-ﬁrm research experience : Elapsed years for an inventor since his/her ﬁrst patent
application in the tenure.
Total past productivity : Cumulative number of patents applied by an inventor up to a
given year.
Average past productivity : Annual average of the number of patent applications of an
inventor up to a given year.
Firm’s productivity : The number of patents applied by inventors in an assignee in one
year.
Referee’s productivity : The number of patents applied by the referee of an inventor in
one year.
The ﬁrst-year dummy : The dummy variable indicating the ﬁrst year of patent applica-
tion period in the tenure.
Annual dummies Dnn(nn = 75; : : : ; 97) : Yearly dummies deﬁned over 1975¡1997.
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